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THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE UPENDS 
THE LAW OF REMAINDERS 
Jesse Dukeminier* 
Nothing is more settled in the law of remainders than that an 
indefeasibly vested remainder is transmissible to the remainder-
man's heirs or devisees upon the remainderman's death. Thus, 
where a grantor conveys property "to A for life, then to B and her 
heirs," B's remainder passes to B's heirs or devisees if B dies during 
the life of A. Inheritability of vested remainders was recognized in 
the time of Edward I, and devisability was recognized with the Stat-
ute of Wills in 1540. 
Section 2-707 of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC),1 adopted in 
1990, upends this law. In a comprehensive remake of the law of 
remainders, section 2-707 provides that, unless the trust instrument 
provides otherwise, all fu.ture interests in trust are contingent on the 
beneficiary's surviving the distribution date. Additionally, if a re-
mainderman does not survive to the distribution date, the UPC cre-
ates a substitute gift in the remainderman's then-surviving 
descendants. If the remainderman has no surviving descendants, 
the remainder fails, and on the life tenant's death the property 
passes to the testator's residuary devisees or to the settlor's heirs. 
This sea change in the law of remainders was set in motion by 
the Code's revisers when they expanded the antilapse idea of the 
law of wills to include trust remainders.2 Under the law of wills, if a 
devisee predeceases the testator, antilapse statutes give the devise 
to the devisee's descendants if the devisee bears a particular rela-
tionship to the testator - usually kindred, but sometimes close kin-
dred. The UPC drafters decided that the antilapse statute 
applicable to wills3 should apply to will substitutes, such as con-
tracts with payable-on-death (P-0-D) designations.4 They then fur-
* Maxwell Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. A.B. 1948, Harvard; 
J.D. 1951, Yale. - Ed. 
1. UNIF. PROB. CODE§ 2-707 (1993). 
2. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC's New Survivorship 
and Anti/apse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1091, 1131-33 (1992). 
3. UNIF. PROB. CoDE § 2-603 (1993). 
4. UNIF. PROB. CoDE § 2-706 (1993). Section 2-706 does not apply to all contracts with P-
0-D designations, but only to those under which the P-0-D beneficiaries must survive the 
decedent in order to take. See UNIF. PROB. CODE§ 2-706(a)(2} (1993). It does not impose a 
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ther adapted the antilapse statute to trust remainders, changing the 
requirement that a beneficiary survive the testator to a requirement 
that a remainderman survive to the date of distribution and applying 
it to all trust remainders and not just to remainders given to the 
testator's kindred.5 There is merit in the idea that antilapse statutes 
should apply to all will substitutes, including revocable trusts, thus 
requiring the beneficiary to survive the decedent donor, and provid-
ing a substitute gift to the issue of beneficiaries who do not.6 But 
expanding the antilapse idea to a requirement that trust remainder-
men must survive to the termination of the trust raises entirely dif-
ferent questions. Irrevocable inter vivos trusts, testamentary trusts, 
and revocable trusts that continue as irrevocable trusts after the set-
tlor's death are not will substitutes, and the substantive law of wills 
cannot be applied to them on the theory that they are functionally 
analogous transfers. 
The proposal to supplant the existing law of remainders with an 
antilapse-like statute may have merit, not by analogy to will substi-
tutes but as an independent claim that the antilapse idea better car-
ries out the settlor's intent and better serves subsidiary public 
policies. There are two crucial questions. First, does the antilapse 
idea carry out the settlor's intent better than the traditional law of 
remainders? Second, does an antilapse law or the common law of 
remainders better serve public policy concerns, including reducing 
litigation and complexity? As for the first question, neither the Of-
ficial Comment nor the drafters' law review commentary7 presents 
empirical evidence indicating that most trust settlors want a remain-
derman to lose the remainder if he does not survive the life tenant, 
substituting his descendants for him if he leaves descendants. The 
survivorship requirement on all P-0-D beneficiaries, unlike § 2-707, which imposes a survi-
vorship requirement on all remaindermen. See UNIF. PROB. CODE§ 2-707{b) (1993). The 
Official Comment offers no explanation for this inconsistency. 
5. UPC § 2-603, the antilapse statute applicable to wills, applies only to devises to a 
grandparent, a descendant of a grandparent, or a stepchild of the testator. See UNIF. PRoB. 
CODE§ 2-603{b) {1993). UPC§ 2-706, applicable to P-0-D contracts, is similar. See UNIF. 
PROB. CoDE § 2-706(b) (1993). If the antilapse idea is to apply to trust remainders, the stat-
utes should be consistent What justification is there for presuming the testator intends that 
only descendants of deceased close kindred take devises and P-0-D contracts but descend-
ants of any deceased remainderman take remainders in a revocable trust? 
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 27.1 cmt. e {1987) {Donative Transfers) 
takes the position that antilapse statutes should apply to revocable trusts. 
In Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Turner, 529 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio 1988), an Ohio court 
applied the antilapse statute to a revocable trust. At the urging of the Ohio bar, the legisla-
ture reversed the decisional law by enacting a statute providing that the antilapse statute 
does not apply to any remainders in trust, revocable or irrevocable. Omo REV. CoDE ANN. 
§ 2107.01 (Anderson 1994). 
7. See Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 2. 
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drafters appear to be proceeding purely on their own speculation. 
In fact, it seems just as likely that trust settlors intend to cede con-
trol of the remainder to the remainderman to permit the remain-
derman to deal with changes in his family circumstances during the 
life tenant's life. Before a fundamental change in the law of re-
mainders is made, some empirical evidence should show that the 
common law has read people wrong for centuries. 
Favoring property passing to the descendants of a beneficiary is, 
of course, an old idea in the law. Courts often construe ambiguous 
trust instruments so as to pass a remainder to the remainderman's 
descendants rather than having it pass outside the remainderman's 
immediate family. But protection of descendants is not the issue 
here. If the remainder is devisable or inheritable, as under current 
law, descendants will take the remainder unless the remainderman 
diverts it to others. The issue is whether the power of a remainder-
man to act in what he perceives as the best interests of the family 
should be taken away. 
Section 2-707 is a revolutionary statute, and states should care-
fully consider its ramifications before enactment. It is the purpose 
of this article to examine those ramifications. 
Loss OF FLEXIBILITY 
A law of remainders fashioned by section 2-707 of the UPC will 
be very different from current law. Perhaps the most important 
practical difference will be the loss of flexibility in the beneficiary's 
disposition of future interests. 
In this respect, section 2-707 can be fairly described as retrogres-
sive, slipping trusts back to the days before flexible powers of ap-
pointment came into widespread use. When a trust is created for A 
for life, remainder to B, B has the equivalent of a general power of 
appointment over the remainder. If B dies before A, B can trans-
mit the remainder at death to anyone B chooses. Under UPC sec-
tion 2-707, B's remainder is made contingent upon surviving A. If 
B dies during A's life leaving descendants, B's descendants are sub-
stituted for B. B has no power to transmit the remainder to others. 
A principal feature of sound estate planning in the twentieth 
century is creating flexibility in trusts, which experience has shown 
to be highly desirable.8 The transmissible vested remainder rule of 
8. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., The Use of Powers of Appointment in Estate Planning, 45 
lowA L. REV. 691 (1960): 
Whenever one seeks to control the devolution of his property over extended periods, 
possibly for several generations .•. flexibility becomes a significant element in the sue-
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the common law is a substitute for a power of appointment over-
looked by the settlor. B can devise the remainder to B's spouse, 
taking advantage of the estate tax marital deduction, and making it 
possible for the spouse to use her $600,000 exemption from the fed-
eral estate tax and $1 million exemption from the generation-
skipping transfer tax in transferring the trust property to their chil-
dren. Or B can devise the remainder to B's children in such shares 
and on such terms as appear wise. If B's children are minors, B can 
devise the remainder in trust for the children until they reach ma-
jority, avoiding conservatorship. If one of B's children is disabled 
and supported by the state in a state institution, B can devise the 
child's share in a trust providing the child only with benefits supple-
menting those the state provides, thus avoiding the state's seizure of 
the child's full share as the child's creditor, as section 2-707 would 
allow. 
Under section 2-707, B does not have these choices. In all cases 
B's descendants are substituted for B if B dies during A's life. If B's 
descendants are minors, a court will have to appoint a conservator 
to manage their property -· an Undesirable and expensive arrange-
ment that B can avoid under present law. In some states, the court 
must appoint guardians ad litem to represent minors in the trustee's 
accounting - an additional expense. Whether or not B has chil-
dren, B cannot pass the property to B's spouse. No statute can pick 
the appropriate substitute takers as well as living persons.9 
It seems particularly odd that the UPC revisers in section 2-707 
make it impossible for B to benefit B's spouse any longer, inasmuch 
as the modem trend is to increase the protection of the spouse. The 
Retirement Equity Act of 1984,10 requiring a pension to be paid as 
a joint-and-survivor annuity to the employee and his or her spouse 
unless the spouse consents otherwise, is an illustration of this mod-
em trend. So, too, are laws calling for equitable division of prop-
cess of the dispositive scheme .... [A power of appointment] enables adjustments to be 
made in accordance with changes in family membership or in accordance with changes in 
the physical, mental (especially in the event of incapacity to manage property), and fi-
nancial welfare of family members. Also to be considered are subsequent legal, social, 
and economic developments. 
Id. at 692-93. 
9. In an earlier article, Professor Waggoner, one of the chief drafters of section 2-707, 
favored a vested construction and opposed extending antilapse provisions to future interests 
for the reasons given above. "[I]t seems far better for the predeceased legatee, rather than 
the legislature, to decide how best to provide for his own family .... " Lawrence W. 
Waggoner, Future Interests Legislation: Implied Conditions of Survivorship and Substitution-
ary Gifts Under the New Illinois "Anti-Lapse" Provision, 1969 U. Iu. L.F. 423, 438. 
10. Pub. L. No. 98-937, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 
U.S.C.). 
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erty upon divorce. The 1990 UPC provisions relating to intestacy11 
and the elective share12 continue this trend by increasing the 
spouse's share significantly beyond that given in most states. Stud-
ies have shown that in many cases - especially in smaller estates 
and where the decedent has no descendants - the spouse is the 
primary object of the decedent's bounty.13 
Where trusts have been created for a child for life, with a re-
mainder to the child's children, overlooking the needs of the child's 
surviving spouse, desperate beneficiaries sometimes have adopted 
their spouse as a child in an attempt to continue trust support for 
the spouse.14 These wife-adoption cases are vivid lessons in how far 
beneficiaries will go to remedy inadequate trust drafting that has 
overlooked a beneficiary's natural desire to benefit a spouse. Sec-
tion 2-707 imbeds this omission in the statutes. Why do the revisers 
assume that the decedent would want to be generous with his or her 
spouse but would want to cut out a beneficiary's spouse? Is this 
merely an irresistible atavism of our English inheritance, revering 
the blood line and effacing the son's wife? 
LITIGATION ISSUES lNvoLVING LAPSE INTRODUCED !Nro LAW 
OF REMAINDERS 
Section 2-707 is a rule of construction. It yields to a finding of a 
contrary intent. If a remainder is given "to B or her estate" or "to 
B whether or not B survives the life tenant," B's remainder will be 
devisable and inheritable as under current law. 
Establishing a contrary intent may be a fruitful source of litiga-
tion. It imports into the law of remainders issues commonly liti-
gated in cases of lapse under the law of wills. A look at three of 
these issues is illustrative. First, suppose that a trust is created "for 
A for life, then to B and her heirs." Does the use of the phrase 
"and her heirs" indicate a contrary intent, an intent that B's heirs 
take if B does not survive? Of course, all lawyers know that "and 
her heirs" is superfluous, meaning only "in fee simple," and yet in 
11. UNIF. PRoB. ConE § 2-102 {1993). The spouse takes all if the decedent leaves no 
descendant or parent or if all of the decedent's descendants are also all of the descendants of 
the spouse. In all other circumstances the spouse takes at least one-half. 
12. UNIF. PROB. CoDE §§ 2-201 to 2-214 (1993). 
13. See Mary L. Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and 
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 319, 348-64 (citing 
earlier studies). 
14. See, e.g., In re Belgard's Trust, 829 P.2d 457 {Colo. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 1992 
Colo. LEXIS 420 (May 11, 1992); Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 
340 (Ky. 1967). In both cases, the court did not void the adoption but held that the settlor did 
not intend to include adult adoptees as descendants of the beneficiary. 
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some lapse cases "and her heirs" has been read to mean "or her 
heirs," creating a substitute gift in B's heirs.1s In that way lapse has 
been avoided. It seems odd that different consequences would 
turn, in: the twenty-first century, on the inclusion of the phrase "and 
her heirs" in creating a remainder, a phrase we have long thought 
obsolete. Yet, if states adopt section 2-707, the lapse cases may pre-
sage the revival of the importance of this phrase in the law of 
remainders. 
A second example of lapse litigation moving into the law of re-
mainders involves an express requirement that the beneficiary sur-
vive to the date of distribution. Does such a requirement of 
survival state an intention that B's descendants not be substituted 
for B if B predeceases A? Contrary to what most lawyers would 
probably infer, section 2-707(b)(3) provides that words of survivor-
ship attached to a future interest do not state an intent that de-
scendants not be substituted for the deceased remainderman. Thus: 
Case 1. T devises a fund in trust "for A for life, then to B if B 
survives A." At common law, the words "if B survives A" state a 
condition precedent of survival, and if B dies before A, the remainder 
fails. Under section 2-707, however, the words "if B survives A" do 
not indicate that the transferor does not want B's descendants substi-
tuted for B if B predeceases A. If B predeceases A, leaving descend-
ants, the descendants take, in spite of this language. 
This rule of construction is taken from the 1990 UPC antilapse 
statute applicable to wills. In cases involving the application of an 
antilapse statute to lapsed gifts in wills, most courts have held that 
an express requirement of survivorship states an intent that the an-
tilapse statute not apply.16 Hence, a devise "to A if A survives me" 
does not go to A's descendants if A predeceases the testator. 
Under the 1990 revision of the Uniform Probate Code, the drafters 
reversed this majoi;i.ty rule, giving A's lapsed gift to A's descendants 
even though the will states "if A survives me."17 This action of the 
1990 UPC drafters has come under sharp criticism: 
Instead of allowing "if he survives me" to mean what almost everyone 
would expect it to mean, the revisers have translated it into, "if he 
survives me, and, if he does not survive me, to his issue who survive 
me." For those unfamiliar with estate planning esoterica, therefore, it 
15. See, e.g., Jackson v. Schultz, 151 A.2d 284 (Del. Ch. 1959); cf. Hofing v. Wtllis, 201 
N.E.2d 852 (Ill. 1964). 
16. See 2 REsrATEMENT, supra note 6, § 18.6 cmt a; Patricia J. Roberts, Lapse Statutes: 
Recu"ing Construction Problems, 37 EMORY LJ. 323, 349 & n.88 (1988). 
17. UNIF. PROB. CooE § 2·603 (1993). 
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has become yet more difficult to figure out what the words in a will 
actually mean.18 
This criticism is equally applicable to section 2-707, which provides 
that a remainder "to B if B survives A" goes to B's descendants if B 
dies before A, unless there is an express gift over to a specified 
person who survives the life tenant. 
A third source of litigation in lapse cases is whether the devise 
creates a class gift. If it is a class gift, the gift does not lapse. If the 
devisee does not leave descendants who are substituted by the anti-
lapse statute, the devisee's share goes to the surviving members of 
the class. Litigation over whether the gift is made to a class is ex-
tensive.19 Similar lawsuits may be expected under section 2-707. 
Thus: 
Case 2. T devises a fund in trust "for A for life then to A's chil-
dren, B and C," with a residuary devise to D. B survives T but prede-
ceases A. Under the common law of remainders, B's share of the 
remainder goes to B's heirs or devisees. Whether the remainder is to 
a class is irrelevant. Under section 2-707, the outcome is different. If 
B leaves descendants, B's descendants take the remainder. If B does 
not leave descendants, the result turns on whether the remainder is to 
a class. If it is a class gift, C takes B's share. If it is not a class gift, D 
takes B's share. 
As to what constitutes a class, the authorities may not be "in 
inextricable confusion," as one English judge claimed,20 but they 
surely leave outcomes uncertain in many cases.21 The same lan-
guage may be deemed a gift to a class in one case, but not in an-
other. Extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent appears to play a 
crucial role. The class gift question plays no current role in the 
transmissibility of remainders. 
It must be admitted that section 2-707, in presuming all future 
interests to be contingent upon surviving to distribution, will doubt-
less reduce litigation over whether, under a trust instrument, a re-
18. Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, or More Like the 
Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639, 651-55 (1993); see also Martin D. Begleiter, 
Article II of the Uniform Probate Code and the Malpractice Revolution, 59 TENN. L. REV. 101, 
126-30 (1991) (arguing that the new antilapse provision in the 1990 UPC will increase mal-
practice suits against lawyers who continue to use the language they have used for years -
"to A if A survives me" - expecting the words requiring survivorship to negate the opera-
tion of the antilapse statute). 
19. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 22.4-.11 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). 
20. In re Moss, [1899] 2 Ch. 314, 317 (1898) (Lord Lindley, M.R.), affd., 1901 App. Cas. 
187. 
21. For example, 3 REsrATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 284 (1940) [hereinafter FIRST RE-
STATEMENT] says a gift "to A and the children of B" is a gift to one class whereas 5 AMERI· 
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 19, § 22.13 says it is a gift to an individual, A, and a class 
composed of the children of B. Cf. 3 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 28.1 cmt. g. 
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mainderman is subject to a requirement of survival. But litigation 
of this issue has decreased greatly in the last several decades be-
cause of the increased use, in drafting trusts, of forms that expressly 
settle this matter and because courts have more and more standard-
ized rules of construction, following the Restatement of Property, 22 
the American Law of Property,23 and Powell on Real Property.24 In 
any event, the increase in litigation of other issues imported from 
the law of lapse will likely more than outweigh the reduction in 
litigation over whether survival is required. 
COMPLEX NEW RULES INTRODUCED INTO FUTURE INTERESTS 
Section 2-707 applies to all "future interests" in a trust. The 
term "future interests" is not defined, but presumably it incorpo-
rates the standard definition of a future interest as a nonpossessory 
interest that may become possessory.25 Future interests, in contrast 
to present interests or possessory interests, do not offer immediate 
beneficial enjoyment of the income or the property. Section 2-707 
thus cuts a wide swathe, applying to all remainders, executory inter-
ests, and reversions. All of these are made contingent upon surviv-
ing to the distribution date. 
Section 2-707 eliminates the presumption in favor of vesting, as 
well as a number of well-settled rules of construction favoring a 
vested construction. Since Clobberie's Case,26 for example, it has 
been settled that when a testator devises all interest in property to a 
person but withholds possession until the person reaches a specified 
age, the gift of the property is vested with possession postponed. 
Section 2-707 does away with this rule. Thus: 
Case 3. T bequeaths a fund in trust "to pay income to B until B 
reaches 25, then to pay the principal to B." Under common law, B's 
gift of principal, a future interest, is vested with possession postponed, 
and if B dies under 25, B's estate takes the property. Depending 
upon whether B dies testate or intestate, B's estate may pass to B's 
spouse, children, parents, brothers and sisters, or other devisees. 
Under section 2-707, if B dies under 25, B's descendants take the 
property. If B leaves no descendants, the property goes to the testa-
tor's residuary devisees then surviving, or to their surviving descend-
ants, or, if none, to the testator's surviving heirs. 
22. 3 FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, §§ 249-59. 
23. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 19, §§ 21.10-.25. 
24. 2A RICHARD R. PoWEU., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 27.01-.06 (Patrick J. 
Rohan ed., rev. ed. 1995). 
25. See 2 FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 153, at 520. 
26. 86 Eng. Rep. 476 (Ch. 1677). 
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To deal with successive future interests, and the enormous vari-
ety of complicated trusts, section 2-707 invents a whole new future 
interests vocabulary to determine which alternative future interest 
will be given effect under a variety of circumstances.27 Its complex-
ities and convolutions cannot be summarized here; they are ex-
plained in seven pages of closely analytical reasoning in the Official 
Comments. They must be worked through by the reader at length, 
over and over again, to be understood. Even the drafters them-
selves call the statute "elaborate and intricate," and admit that it 
will require "a few hours" of intense study.28 Case 4 is illustrative. 
Case 4. T bequeaths a fund in trust "for A for life, then to B if B 
survives A, and if B does not survive A, to C." T's residuary devisee is 
D. B then dies, survived by a child, B1• If C survives A, C takes on 
A's death; the express gift over to C is given effect. But if C dies 
before A, survived by a child, C1, who takes on A's death? Here the 
rules become complicated. Under section 2-707, because the words 
"if B survives A" do not state an intent that B's child shall not take in 
B's place, B1 is substituted for B. Similarly, C1 is substituted for the 
deceased remainderman, C. To choose between them, section 2-707 
provides that the substitute takers of the "primary future interest"29 
(B's remainder) take unless the alternative future interest (C's 
remainder) is a "younger-generation future interest."30 Under the 
facts here, if C is a descendant of B, C's remainder is a "younger-
generation future interest," and C1 takes. If, on the other hand, C is 
not a descendant of B, B1 takes. Hence, if B is T's sister and C is T's 
son, B's child B1 takes. 
Apart from the rules about which alternative future interests 
take, section 2-707 brings other mysteries and surprises. If the set-
tlor during life creates an irrevocable trust for A for life, then to B, 
27. Section 2-207's new terms include "primary future interest," "primary substitute gift," 
"younger-generation future interest," "younger-generation substitute gift," and "superseded 
gifts." See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707(a) (1993). 
28. Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 2, at 1048. 
29. " 'Primary future interest' means the future interest that would have taken effect had 
all the deceased beneficiaries of the alternative future interest who left surviving descendants 
survived the distribution date." UNIF. PROB. ConE § 2-707(c)(3)(i) (1993). 
30. 
"Younger-generation future interest" means a future interest that (A) is to a descendant 
of a beneficiary of the primary future interest, (B) is an alternative future interest with 
respect to the primary future interest, (C) is a future interest for which a substitute gift is 
created, and (D) would have taken effect had all the deceased beneficiaries who left 
surviving descendants survived the distribution date except the deceased beneficiary or 
beneficiaries of the primary future interest. 
UNIF. PROB. CoDE § 2-707(c)(3)(iii) {1993). 
A note, Erich Tucker Kimbrough, Lapsing of Testamentary Gifts, Anti/apse Statutes, and 
the Expansion of Uniform Probate Code Anti/apse Protection, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 269, 
310 (1994), calls UPC§ 2-603(c), the subsection of the antilapse statute applicable to alterna-
tive devises, "an interpretive nightmare." The subsection is essentially the same as § 2-
707(c), applicable to alternative future interests in trust. 
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and thereafter B dies without descendants, the settlor has a rever-
sion. If the settlor then dies during A's life, the settlor has no con-
trol over who takes the property. If the settlor leaves surviving 
descendants, they take. If the settlor does not leave surviving de-
scendants, the settlor's heirs take.31 The property does not pass 
under the settlor's will as reversions do under current law. In most 
cases this will defeat the settlor's intent. Where an inter vivos trust 
fails for some reason, and a resulting trust or equitable reversion 
arises in the settlor, the settlor has a second chance to fill a gap in 
the disposition or to correct otherwise the flaw in the original trust. 
Under section 2-707, the settlor cannot say what is to be done with 
the property unless the settlor survives the termination of the trust. 
Why the 1990 UPC revisers chose to pass the property upon the 
termination of the trust to the settlor's heirs, who might not be the 
objects of the settlor's bounty, rather than in accordance with the 
settlor's direction in his will or through his residuary clause is 
inexplicable. 
There is no federal estate tax advantage in making all reversions 
contingent upon surviving to the termination of the trust. Under 
current law, a transmissible reversion is included in the rever-
sioner's federal gross estate under section 2033 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code.32 Under section 2-707 of the UPC, which substitutes 
heirs for the reversioner, the reversion is included in the settlor's 
federal gross estate according to section 2037 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code33 if the reversion is worth more than five percent of the 
value of the property at the settlor's death. Indeed, inasmuch as 
section 2-707 creates a reversion in the settlor in every case of an 
irrevocable inter vivos trust, unless a contrary intent is shown, there 
is a risk that the settlor's reversion implied by law will be taxable in 
his estate under section 2037 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
INCREASE IN ESCHEATS 
The common law dislikes escheats to the state. It favors distri-
bution to private individuals. The transmissible remainder rule 
serves to carry out this policy. 
Because all future interests in trust are, under section 2-707 of 
the UPC, subject to a requirement that their individual owners 
must survive to the distribution date unless the trust instrument 
31. UNIF. PROB. CoDE § 2-707(d) (1993). 
32. I.R.C. § 2033 (1988). 
33. I.R.C. § 2037 (1988). 
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provides otherwise, escheats will increase if these owners die with-
out descendants substituted for them by section 2-707. The Official 
Comment points this out in a rather indirect way. Under section 2-
707, it says, "there will always be a set of substitute takers, even if it 
turns out to be the State."34 This is best seen by an example. 
Case 5. T bequeaths a fund in trust "for A for life, then to B." T's 
residuary devisee is C. Then B dies without issue, devising his prop-
erty to his spouse, D. C dies intestate \vithout issue. Under common 
law, D takes the fund at A's death. Under section 2-707, because B's 
remainder is contingent on surviving A, and B leaves no issue to sub-
stitute for B, B's remainder fails. Likewise, C's residuary gift of the 
trust remainder is contingent upon surviving A, and because C dies 
before A without issue, the gift to C fails. At A's death, the trust fund 
is distributed to T's heirs ascertained as if T died when A died.35 If T 
has no heirs alive at A's death, the property will escheat to the state. 
Skilled lawyers often make all future interests contingent upon 
surviving to the date of distribution, in order to avoid federal estate 
tax on a remainder if a remainderman dies before the life tenant. It 
is common for the lawyer to insert a charity as the ultimate taker if 
all the contingent future interests fail. Section 2-707 substitutes the 
state in this event. 
MORE PERPETUmES VIOLATIONS 
By making all remainders contingent on survival, unless the 
trust instrument provides otherwise, section 2-707 will prevent 
many remainders from being treated as vested under the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. The Rule Against Perpetuities applies only to 
contingent interests, not to vested remainders. Remainders vested 
at common law but made contingent by section 2-707 may violate 
the Rule. A lawyer who follows his or her old reliable forms, una-
ware that a sweeping change in the law of vested remainders has 
been effected by section 2-707 of the UPC, may inadvertently cre-
ate a contingent interest in violation of the Rule and be liable for 
malpractice. 
Section 2-707 applies to all future interests in trust, including 
reversions. Under common law, all reversions are vested and not 
34. UNIF. PROB. CODE§ 2-707 cmt. (1993). 
35. UNIF. PRoB. CoDE § 2-103 (1993) limits heirs to the descendants of the decedent's 
grandparents. This limitation on inheritance has met with considerable resistance in the leg-
islatures, which have not favored escheat. In California, for instance, the legislature adopted 
large portions of the 1969 Uniform Probate Code, but, rejecting the UPC pro-escheat stance, 
the legislature extended intestate succession to all kindred, stepchildren, mothers-in-law, 
fathers-in-law, brothers-in-law, and sisters-in-law - but not to sons-in-law or to daughters-
in-Iaw! CAL PROB. CODE§ 6402(e), (g) (West 1991). 
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subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. Under section 2-707, re-
versions are contingent and subject to the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities. This may result in unexpected violations· of the Rule. The 
two-generation trust involved in Case 6 is an illustration. 
Case 6. T bequeaths his residuary estate in trust "for A for life, 
then to A's children for their lives, then to B." Under common law, 
B's remainder vests upon creation and is valid. B can devise the re-
mainder as B chooses. Under section 2-707, B's remainder is contin-
gent on B's surviving A and A's children, who may not all be in being 
at T's death. But because B must survive these persons to take, the 
remainder in B will vest, if at all, within B's life. It is valid. On the 
other hand, the substitute gift in B's descendants, who may be born 
after T's death, is void because these possibly afterbom descendants 
must survive A's possibly afterbom children. This event will not nec-
essarily occur, if at all, within lives in being. The reversion in T's 
heirs, who are ascertained as if T died when the last child of A dies, is 
also void because the heirs cannot be ascertained until the death of 
A's children, who may be afterbom persons. Who then takes the 
property upon the death of A and A's children, if Bis dead? Appar-
ently, it will go to the state because no valid interests in individuals 
have been created. At common law, this could not happen because 
all reversions are vested, and the reversioner takes if all other inter-
ests are void. 
Some, but not all, of the additional perpetuities violations sec-
tion 2-707 causes will be cured if the jurisdiction has adopted a wait-
and-see statute. If the jurisdiction has adopted the Uniform Statu-
tory· Rule Against Perpetuities,36 for example, no violation of the 
rule can occur until ninety years pass. If at that time contingent 
interests still exist - if, for example, A has a child born after the 
creation of the trust who survives B and is living ninety years after 
the creation of the trust - the court must reform the trust so as to 
best carry out the intentions of the settlor. Such a lawsuit, with no 
predictable outcome, will be a godsend to lawyers. 
MORE DIFFICULTY IN TERMINATING TRUSTS 
Section 2-707 makes it more difficult to terminate trusts. Where 
a trust is created for A for life, remainder to B, the trust can be 
terminated if A and B agree, unless termination would be contrary 
to a material purpose of the settlor. Under section 2-707, it is much 
more difficult to terminate the trust during A's lifetime because B's 
issue who survive A have a potential interest in the trust. Section 2-
707 thus places a substantial restraint upon alienation. 
36. UNIF. STATUTORY R. AGAINST PERPETUITIES WITH 1990 AMENDMENTS § l(a)(2) 
(1990). 
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Many unforeseen problems may arise during long-term trusts: 
changes in the beneficiaries, their needs, and their abilities; changes 
in the tax laws and in different types of investment opportunities; 
unsatisfactory performance by the trustee. Where long-term "dy-
nasty" trusts have been created to avoid estate and generation-
skipping taxes for several generations, and particularly in states 
adopting the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, which 
invites ninety-year dynasty trusts,37 beneficiaries may increasingly 
want to modify or terminate disadvantageous trusts. 
Section 2-707 applies only to future interests in trust, not to legal 
remainders. The drafters excluded legal remainders from the stat-
ute on the ground that giving a contingent interest to the remain-
derman's descendants would make it more difficult for the life 
tenant and the remainderman to give good title in a sale of land.38 
But terminating a trust that has outlived its usefulness is often just 
as important to family welfare as selling land. 
LAW OF EQUITABLE REMAINDERS SEPARATED FROM LAW OF 
LEGAL REMAINDERS 
Section 2-707 preserves the existing common law as it applies to 
legal remainders. The new rules of section 2-707 apply only to fu-
ture interests in trust. This adds an additional body of complicated 
rules for lawyers to know, without abolishing their existing 
counterparts. 
Having separate rules for legal and equitable future interests 
may lead to litigation when it is not clear whether the future inter-
ests are legal or equitable.39 It may revive old learning, thought 
obsolescent, about whether the Statute of Uses applies to the par-
ticular instrument and converts legal interests into equitable ones.40 
Where land is conveyed in trust, the trustee takes only such legal 
37. On $1 million dynasty trusts, which avoid federal estate and GST taxes for the perpe-
tuities period, see Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the 
GST Tax: New Perils for Practitioners and New Opportunities, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J, 
185, 205-09 (1995). 
38. UNIF. PRoB. CODE§ 2-707 cmt (1993). 
39. See 1 AuSTIN WAKEMAN Scorr & WILUAM FRANKLIN PRATCHER, THE LAw OF 
TRusrs § 24.1 (4th ej. 1987) (citing numerous cases litigating whether a devise to two or 
more persons in succession creates a trust or legal estates). 
See also Lux v. Lux, 288 A.2d 701 (R.I. 1972), in which the court held that a devise of 
income-producing real property to the testator's grandchildren aged two to eight, to be pos-
sessed by them when the youngest living grandchild reached 21, created a trust for the 
grandchildren. The court's sensible construction would result, under§ 2-707, in a condition 
of survivorship being imposed upon the grandchildren. 
40. See lA Scorr & PRATCHER, supra note 39, §§ 67-73. 
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estate as is necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trust.41 If 
the trustee takes merely a life estate pur autre vie (for the life bene-
ficiary's life), the remainder is legal, not equitable. Today, whether 
a trustee takes a legal fee simple or a more limited estate is of little 
practical importance. But, under section 2-707, this may become 
once again a lively question in our jurisprudence. 
In the last hundred years the law has made admirable progress 
in merging the law of legal future interests and the law of equitable 
future interests. It applies the same rules of construction to both 
and, in almost all states, the same rules about devisability and in-
heritance. Section 2-707 pulls these rules apart, creating more 
complications. 
AVOIDANCE OF PROBATE ADMINISTRATION 
One disadvantage of transmissible remainders is that the re-
mainder passes through probate at the remainderman's death, in-
curring probate costs. Indeed, the stated rationale for section 2-707 
of the UPC is "to prevent cumbersome and costly distributions to 
and through the estates of deceased beneficiaries of future interests, 
who may have died long before the distribution date."42 It is hard 
to understand, however, why, as a matter of policy, future interests 
in trust should be excluded from the estate inventory and other 
nonpossessory interests included. Other nonpossessory interests 
may include copyright royalties, television residuals, an option to 
purchase property, a landlord's reversion in rental property, a fu-
tures contract, life insurance on the life of another, or legal future 
interests. Future interests in trust. are certainly no more "cumber-
some and costly" to administer - or to value - than other non-
possessory interests. 
Any remainderman who wishes to avoid subjecting the remain-
der to probate expenses can transfer the remainder, like other 
property, into a revocable inter vivas trust. The creation of a vested 
remainder does not necessarily mean the remainder will pass 
through probate at the remainderman's death. 
The Official Comment suggests that if the remainderman's per-
sonal representative overlooked the remainder and did not include 
the remainder as an asset.of the remainderman's probate estate, the 
probate estate will have to be reopened and a new administrator 
appointed when the life tenant dies in order to pass title to the re-
41. See lA id. § 88; 4 id. § 345. 
42. UNIF. PRoB. ConE § 2-707 cmt (1993). 
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mainderman's heirs or devisees. The Official Comment does not 
cite a single case for this proposition, which deserves close examina-
tion. If the order for final distribution of a probate estate contains 
an omnibus clause distributing "currently unknown" or "hereafter 
discovered" property to specified persons, no subsequent adminis-
tration is necessary.43 Even without an omnibus clause, no good 
reason appears why the trustee should not be able to distribute the 
trust principal upon termination of the trust directly to the residu-
ary beneficiaries or heirs if they have been determined in the pro-
bate decree. As a Missouri court said: 
Even though there are newly discovered assets of an estate the 
appointment of an administrator of the goods unadministered is not 
required unless there are unpaid allowed claims against the estate, or 
other good cause is shown. What may constitute other good cause is 
not defined and has not been fully developed by the cases. The 
phrase would appear to include situations where it was uncertain who, 
as heirs or distributees, is entitled to receive the newly discovered as-
sets. If there are no debts and it is clear who is entitled to the newly 
discovered assets, and all parties interested therein can be brought 
before the court, it has been held proper for those distributees or 
heirs to maintain an action to collect or reduce to their possession the 
newly discovered assets of the estate without the appointment of an 
administrator of the goods unadministered.44 
In some jurisdictions, cases hold that a trustee may distribute the 
trust assets to the current owners of the remainder, without reopen-
ing probate for a deceased remainderman.45 In a jurisdiction that 
requires reopening probate estates to pass title to a remainder not 
previously inventoried, a simple statute authorizing the trustee to 
distribute the trust property directly to the persons entitled on the 
distribution date could cure the problem. There is no need to re-
verse 700 years of law to accomplish this result. 
FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXATION ON REMAINDERMAN'S DEATH 
A second disadvantage of transmissible remainders is that a 
transmissible remainder is subject to federal estate taxation if the 
remainderman dies during the life tenant's life. Prior to 1986, a 
number of academic commentators opposed the common law pre-
43. See, e.g., 2 CAUFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF nm BAR, CAUFORNIA PRO· 
BATE WORKFLOW MANuAL, REVISED, § 18.29, at 573 (1995) (form for petition for distribu-
tion contains omnibus clause); see also CAL. PRoB. CODE§ 11642 (West 1991). 
44. In re Estate ofWaller,559 S.W.2d 312,317 (Mo. a. App.1977) (quoting4 ALMON H. 
MAus, PROBATE LAW & PRAcncE § 1523, at 644 (1960)). 
45. Security Trust Co. v. Irvine, 93 A.2d 528 (Del. Ch. 1953); see also Estate of Stanford, 
315 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1957) (ordering the distribution of trust principal directly to the devisee of 
a vested remaindennan). 
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sumption of vesting because of the potential estate taxation of a 
remainder at a remainderman's death.46 This disadvantage of 
transmissible remainders was neutralized, however, with the enact-
ment of the federal generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax in 
1986.47 
Although section 2-707 of the UPC prevents a federal estate tax 
from being imposed at the remainderman's death by eliminating 
the remainder's transmissibility, section 2-707 may result in imposi-
tion of a generation-skipping transfer tax in its place. Section 2-707 
substitutes the descendants of the dead remainderman for the re-
mainderman. If the remainderman is of a generation below the 
trust settlor, this substitution results in a transfer to persons two or 
more generations below the settlor - a generation-skipping trans-
fer. Unless the generation-skipping transfer is sheltered by the $1 
million exemption48 or an exception to the GST tax, a GST tax of 
fifty-five percent of the trust corpus will be levied at the life tenant's 
death.49 
Because numerous factors may come into play in any individual 
case - available exemptions from estate and GST taxes, marital 
deduction for estate tax, stepped-up basis for assets subject to es-
tate tax, state death taxes - it is not possible to say whether the 
present transmissible remainder rule or section 2-707 will be more 
advantageous for taxpayers. The benefits and burdens of each rule 
will depend on the individual case. Because no clear general tax-
payer advantage results from one rule rather than the other, the 
respective merits of section 2-707 and the transmissible remainder 
rule should be evaluated on some basis other than an assumption 
that one of them is generally preferable for tax reasons. 
WHAT A SKILLED ESTATE PLANNER WouLD Do 
In assaying the merits of a default rule such as section 2-707, it is 
useful to compare it with what a skilled estate planner would do in 
the circumstances. How close does the default rule come in giving 
the clients of the unskilled the advantages of skill? An experienced 
estate planner would want to avoid taxes, keep administrative costs 
46. See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND EsrATES 439 n.20 
(1988) (listing commentators). 
47. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-154, § 1431(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2717-2729 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
48. I.R.C. § 2631 (1988). 
49. The GST tax is levied at the highest rate of the estate tax, which is currently 55%. See 
I.R.C. § 2001(c) (Supp. V 1993). 
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low, eliminate ambiguities, and give the beneficiaries power to cope 
with changing circumstances. The result would be a trust looking 
something like this: 
Case 7. T devises a fund in trust "for A for life, then to B if B 
survives A, and if B does not survive A, then to such one or more of 
B's spouse and B's descendants and their spouses as B appoints by 
will. If B fails to exercise the power of appointment, the trust prop-
erty shall be distributed on A's death to B's descendants then living 
[or over to others]." 
In Case 7, B does not have a remainder transmissible at B's death 
because B is required to survive A. The remainder will not be in-
cluded in B's probate estate or subject to federal estate tax if B 
predeceases A. Any disadvantages of transmissible remainders 
have been avoided. On the other hand, B has a special power of 
appointment that gives B the ability to deal with changing circum-
stances.so The objects of the power include spouses, making it pos-
sible to take advantage of the marital deduction as well as spousal 
exemptions from the estate tax and the generation-skipping transfer 
tax. If B dies during A's life, resulting in a generation-skipping 
transfer at A's death, B can avoid the GST tax by exercising the 
special power so as to throw the trust remainder into B's taxable 
federal gross estate.51 If the remainder is included in B's federal 
gross estate, and subjected to estate tax, no GST tax is payable at 
A's death. A special power of appointment gives the donee the op-
tion of paying an estate tax on the value of the remainder at rates 
from thirty-seven to fifty-five percent rather than a generation-
skipping transfer tax at the life tenant's death on the full value of 
the property at fifty-five percent rate. 
Which default rule - the current law of transmissible remain-
ders or section 2-707 - more closely resembles what a skilled 
drafter would do? The common law creates a general power rather 
than a preferred special power in the remainderman, which makes 
it more difficult - but not impossible - for the remainderman to 
save federal transfer taxes. The common law gives the remainder-
man power to deal with changing events, applying intelligence to 
50. A skilled estate planner might give the life tenant rather than the remaindennan a 
special power of appointment if the life tenant is competent and has sound judgment. 
51. Under I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3), if tlie donee exercises a special power by creating a gen-
eral inter vivos power in another, the property subject to the special power will be subject to 
estate tax at the donee's death. This is known as the "Delaware Tax 'frap," because the 
provision was inserted in the Code to deal with some peculiar Delaware perpetuities law. Ir 
the donee chooses to fall into the Delaware Tax Trap, and subject the remainder to estate tax, 
no GST tax is payable. See JESSE DuKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND EsTATES 711, 873-74, 1084-85 (5th ed. 1995). 
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the circumstances as they exist at the remainderman's death. In 
contrast, section 2-707 of the UPC offers no tax advantage and, 
most important, leaves the family stuck with an unchangeable 
course of inheritance preordained from the creation of the trust. 
In the most comprehensive examination of whether an antilapse 
statute is preferable to the common law of remainders, Professor 
French compared these two sets of rules to what skilled estate plan-
ners do in creating trusts.52 She concluded that an antilapse statute 
is not better than the common law if descendants are unalterably 
substituted for the remainderman who predeceases the life tenant. 
This would impede sound and flexible estate planning by the re-
mainderman. French concluded that imposing a requirement of 
survival on remaindermen was justified only if they were given, by 
statute, a broad special power of appointment permitting the re-
mainderman maximum flexibility to adapt to changes after the cre-
ation of the trust - in other words, providing by statute what a 
skilled estate planner would provide.53 The UPC revisers did not 
narrow the remainderman's current general power to a special 
power as French recommended. They eliminated the power to deal 
with changing circumstances altogether. It seems unlikely that any 
skilled estate planner would draft a trust that resembles what the 
client of an unskilled lawyer would get under section 2-707. 
CONCLUSION 
Very likely any legislature adopting section 2-707 would make it 
prospective only, inasmuch as retroactive application might be held 
to be an unconstitutional taking of property from the current own-
ers of transmissible remainders.54 If the legislature were to make 
section 2-707 prospective only, for some years to come lawyers 
would be responsible for knowing pre-enactment future interests 
law about transmissible remainders as well as the complicated new 
law of section 2-707, broadening their exposure to malpractice. 
Section 2-707 likely will not commend itself to practitioners, who 
will be required to learn new rules and revise their trust forms -
all for changes that arguably do not benefit the public welfare. 
52. Susan F. French, Imposing a General Survival Requirement on Beneficiaries of Future 
Interests: Solving the Problems Caused by the Death of a Beneficiary Before the Time Set for 
Distribution, 27 Aruz. L. REv. 801 (1985). 
53. Id. at 835-36. 
54. See Lake of the Woods Assn. v. McHugh, 380 S.E.2d 872 (Va.1989) (holding retroac-
tive application of wait-and-see perpetuities statute to previously vested interests 
unconstitutional). 
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It is not possible to say whether the common law or section 2-
707 of the UPC most likely carries out the intent of the average 
trust settlor. There is no empirical evidence one way or the other. 
Judged by other criteria, the common law looks much more attrac-
tive than section 2-707. It gives flexibility to family members to 
deal with changes occurring during the life tenant's life, flexibility 
that section 2-707 eliminates. Section 2-707 will make more difficult 
modification or termination of trusts that, with the passage of time, 
become disadvantageous to the family. Section 2-707 \vill likely in-
crease litigation, complexity in the law, and malpractice exposure. 
The only advantage of section 2-707 is that it eliminates remainders 
from remaindermen's probate estates, possibly saving probate 
costs. If there are probate administration costs associated with re-
mainders, which· have never been documented, they are a small 
price to pay for the flexibility of the common law. 
Uniform Probate Code section 2-707 creates a new estate in re-
mainder: an estate that passes only to the descendants of the re-
mainderman. The English Parliament in 1285 by the Statute De 
Donis authorized a rather similar estate, either in possession or in 
remainder: It was called a fee tail. After centuries of experience, 
the fee tail was found to deprive the head of family of power to 
make wise and flexible dispositions of family land, to interfere 
greatly with marketability of land, and to have numerous other dis-
advantages. It was abolished in almost all American jurisdictions 
by the end of the nineteenth century, and finally, in 1925, in Eng-
land. It is not too far off the mark to say that section 2-707 of the 
UPC is a piece of feudalism redivivus. 
